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Enrique Dussel, in Ethics of Liberation in the Age of Globalisation and Exclusion
undertakes the major challenge of formulating a narrative of emancipation in the 
context of crises of grand emancipatory narratives. Based on the thorough and 
detailed critique of the foundations of Western philosophy, Dussel proposes the 
design of a new ethics that takes into account not only the oppressive nature of 
capitalism but also the historical distribution of power in what the author calls 
geopolitics. The aim is ‘to lay the bases for new horizons of strategic and tactical 
ethical reasoning grounding in the methaethics of liberation’ (xviii). Latin America, 
due to its peripheral place in the distribution given by the Modern world-system 
becomes, therefore, a ‘privilege’ site from where it becomes possible to ‘reason’ a 
new ethics of liberation.   
For Dussel, it is the combination of capitalism and colonialism that is leading 
humanity to a tragic and unprecedented conflagration, to a collective suicide. He finds 
that it is the actual point of departure of Western philosophy what needs to be 
displaced in order to recreate a new ethics that can lead to new revolutionary utopias. 
It was the establishment of the Hellenocentrism the moment when the world-system 
actually started having a centre, and consequently, multiple subordinated peripheries. 
This was not the case in the 4th millennium BC when the Egyptian-Mesopotamian era 
constituted a world operated without a centre, and the culture was the ‘affirmation of 
life’, rather than reason. He says that Amerindia as subsystem established a 
foundational moment of Modernity and its integration was naturalised through a 
process of rationalisation which hollowed its particularity and made it governable, 
under social imaginaries that crystallised its subordinated position. The ‘crises of 
Modernity’, for the author, implies ignoring the peripheral world which sits as simple 
spectators rather than subjects of transformation. The negation of Modernity becomes 
therefore what Dussel believes comes first in the rebuilding of a new and truly ethics
of liberation.  
Against Taylor’s ‘modern self’ Dussel poses the construction of the ‘peripheral self’, 
built on the ‘materiality of human life’ and the analysis of the exercise of critical 
practical reason, anchored in the experience from the standpoint of the historical 
practice of the victim (p. 208). In an argument similar to the politics of aesthetics 
understood as regimes of visibility and invisibility (Rancière, 2011), Dussel states that 
the affirmation of the victim happens beyond ‘being’, if being is the foundation of the 
system. The victim is ‘the other’, distinct from the system, which is concealed and 
ultimately reveals Modernity as a totality, a closed system which cannot be 
transformed from within but against it. 
Dussel unfolds his thesis in two parts, six chapters, one introduction and two useful 
appendixes. The first part is dedicated to criticise the foundation of Western notion of 
ethics and also to pose, in relation to the latter, his ‘goodness claim’ (p.108). The 
goodness claim in Dussel’s work aims to go beyond formalists and materialists as 
form and content are presented as interdependent dimensions in the development of 
‘practical truths’ (content) vis-à-vis intersubjective validity (form). Like Hegel and 
Marx, Dussel thinks the constitution of ‘the good subject’ in three dialectical 
movements: 1) the negation of the victims’ otherness by the victims themselves; 2) 
the affirmation of the ‘community of victims’ which critically negates the victims’ 
status, poses a threat to the system and equally creates the communitarian space for 
symmetrical recognition; and, finally, the third movement is about the birth of the 
praxis of liberation in the strict sense because the systemic negation of the victims is 
in itself negated in a process which is destructive and equally creative and liberating 
in a ethically feasible manner (pp. 211-213).
In his model of liberation Dussel seems to have come full circle, i.e. departing from 
Marxism only to arrive to an equally problematic Marxist-like understanding of the 
logic of emergence of the ‘good subject’, replacing the working class for the victims 
of Modernity. Dussel’s conception of ethics is normative and hence seeks the 
replacement of one totality (Modernity) by another (ethical) totality dictated by the 
liberated victims. This means the ‘end of history’ overcame by a new fully structured 
historical moment. The task ahead for the progressive forces of the continent and of 
the world seem to be precisely revealing the fictional fullness of Modernity, its 
incomplete hegemonic structuration which opens up radical and multiple 
opportunities for plural emancipations rather than one unique and singular liberation.
In Dussel’s book ethical actions can only be understood in relation to the fullness of 
being, i.e. the ‘good subject’, produced within the community of victims, emerging 
from the margins of the world system fully enacted against the Modern form of 
domination. However, in the movement of transition from oppression to liberation, 
the (becoming) subject will forge a variety of partial actions contaminated with 
experience, with discourse, and therefore with pre-existing object and places.
Although Dussel does try to integrate the experience and also tries to reject the 
division between form and content, he only partially integrates the former and does 
not fully give account of the latter. The radical integration of experience into social 
theory means discovering the undecidability of things which are presented as being 
either joined or separated (Laclau, 2002). Dussel does not undertake the necessary 
deconstruction of ‘the excluded’ but instead assumes its homogeneous, symmetrical 
existence. Likewise, he not only presents a (universal) criterion of ethics but also 
names the subject of liberation and hence transforms what should be ‘ethical 
investment’ (Laclau, 2002) into normative ethics. Again, liberation needs to be 
thought in plural, integrating the hybridity of the popular, because the creation of
contingently unconditional spaces of freedom and equality will be the result of 
rebellious contaminated collective action within an entirely conditioned universe.  
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